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FIND MY CRIMINALS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE UNIVERSAL CELL PHONE “APP” THAT EVERY CELL PHONE 
USER HAS BUT NO CRIMINAL WANTS 
Christopher Joseph* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two men were out one Friday evening, perhaps beginning a weekend of fun, and 
drove to meet Kendrick Herring.1 Once all the men were together, Herring began 
talking with the two men; shortly thereafter, the evening took a deadly turn when 
Herring produced a .45 caliber handgun and began shooting at the two men, hitting 
them both.2 The frightened and wounded victims fled the area and managed to make 
it to one of their homes; one man eventually died from his gunshot wounds, but the 
other survived, having been struck in one of his arms.3 The police began 
investigating as soon as they were notified, and they managed to obtain Herring’s 
cell phone information from the surviving victim.4 Using this information and 
operating under exigent circumstances, the police were able to obtain Herring’s real-
time cell phone location data, which allowed them to quickly locate Herring and 
secure key evidence to support his conviction—namely, the handgun used in the 
murder and the cell phone Herring used to communicate with the two men prior to 
their meeting.5 
Despite the heinous nature of Herring’s crime, the highlighted issue in that case 
was not whether Herring murdered one man and attempted to murder another; 
instead, the focus was centered on whether the police were allowed to obtain the 
location of Herring’s cell phone without a warrant following these events.6 Given 
that approximately ninety-two percent of American adults own a mobile phone of 
 ________________________  
 * J.D. Candidate, 2017, Barry University School of Law; M.S. Criminal Justice, University of Central 
Florida, 2008; B.S. Computer Engineering, University of Central Florida, 2005. Sergeant, Orange County Sheriff’s 
Office, Orange County, Florida. Certified Forensic Computer Examiner, International Association of Computer 
Investigative Specialists. Thanks to my faculty advisor Eang Ngov, and to my legal research and writing professor 
Helia Hull, who provided encouragement and assistance throughout my law school career. Also, I extend my 
gratitude to my brothers and sisters in law enforcement, who strive to fight a never-ending battle on an ever-changing 
battlefield. 
 1. Herring v. State, 168 So. 3d 240, 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g denied (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review 
dismissed, 173 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. Ultimately, the court held that although the government claimed it was operating under exigent 
circumstances, it had failed to sufficiently demonstrate such an exigency. Id. at 244. 
 6. See Herring, 168 So. 3d at 243 (reviewing whether police were allowed to obtain the location of Herring’s 
cell phone without a warrant). 
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some kind (up from sixty-five percent just over a decade ago),7 concerns about the 
government conducting warrantless tracking of a cell phone are certainly justified.8 
This is especially true because using a cell phone’s location for electronic tracking 
has become a routine tool in law enforcement, exceeding the use of both wiretaps 
and global positioning satellite (GPS) tracking.9 However, using this valuable tool 
allows police to track and apprehend dangerous criminals like Herring within the 
span of hours,10 instead of allowing them to remain at large, potentially committing 
other crimes. 
As is commonly the case with competing interests, the struggle to balance 
concerns about individual privacy against the need for public safety and effective 
law enforcement has led to varying decisions in different jurisdictions—especially 
because the Supreme Court of the United States left this precise issue open.11 For 
example, some courts have concluded that the government is required to obtain a 
search warrant based on probable cause before obtaining the real-time location of a 
cell phone12—the Florida Supreme Court being among them.13 However, other 
courts have held that a search warrant is not required in order to obtain or use such 
information, in many cases because the information obtained was limited to the 
defendant’s travels on public roadways,14 or because the cell phone’s location 
information is voluntarily disclosed to a third party.15 Adding to the confusion, 
whether a warrant is required for real-time location information could depend on 
whether the information obtained will be used in a state or federal court; in Florida, 
while state courts have held that a warrant is required,16 federal courts faced with the 
 ________________________  
 7. Monica Anderson, PEW RESEARCH CTR., TECHNOLOGY DEVICE OWNERSHIP: 2015 5 (2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/10/PI_2015-10-29_device-ownership_FINAL.pdf. 
 8. See Adam Serwer, The US Government Can Track Your Location at Any Time Without a Warrant, 
MOTHER JONES (August 16, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/08/court-warrant-cellphone-gps-data 
(discussing concerns about the government tracking cell phones without a warrant, including invasions of reasonable 
expectations of privacy). 
 9. Julia Angwin & Scott Thurm, Judges Weigh Phone Tracking, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203733504577024092345458210. 
 10. Herring, 168 So. 3d at 242. The police began tracking Herring’s cell phone at 2:50 a.m., and he was 
apprehended at 4:00 a.m. the same day. Id. 
 11. United States v. Jones (Jones II), 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (pointing out 
that physical intrusion upon a vehicle decided the case, but expressing concerns over forms of surveillance which 
do not require a physical trespass); Serwer, supra note 8 (noting that Jones II “avoided concluding whether or not a 
GPS in a phone would similarly require a warrant” as did placing a GPS device on a vehicle). 
 12. See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (imposing a warrant requirement in order to obtain 
the real-time location of a cell phone); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location 
Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 583 (D. Md. 2011) (same); In re Application for Pen Register 
& Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same). 
 13. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 511 (Fla. 2014) (“[T]he use of real time cell site location information to 
track Tracey violated the Fourth Amendment because probable cause was required, but not provided.”). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–78 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that defendant had no 
expectation of privacy in the location of his cell phone because the police could have obtained the same information 
by following his vehicle); United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted and judgment 
vacated on other grounds sub nom., Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005) (same). 
 15. See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 146 (E.D.N.Y 2013) 
(pointing out that cell phone users “cannot possibly labor under the belief that their location is somehow kept secret” 
after being disclosed to service providers and thus users cannot maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy as to 
their location). 
 16. See, e.g., Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 511. 
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same issue have held that a search warrant is not required.17 Finally, whether 
probable cause is required in order to obtain historical location information is also 
not clearly established among courts in different jurisdictions. Some courts require 
a warrant when the requested records cover “a sufficiently long—albeit undefined—
period of time” but do not require one when the request is shorter than this undefined 
time frame.18 However, a majority of courts have concluded that historical location 
information can be obtained without a warrant regardless of the time period covered 
in the request for information.19 Given the lack of direction on how to obtain and use 
cell phone location information in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, and the 
increasing prevalence of its use in law enforcement investigations, a definitive 
answer from the Supreme Court may be necessary in order to provide appropriate 
direction to law enforcement officials. 
This note explores the Fourth Amendment implications behind law enforcement 
obtaining and using cell site location information (CSLI) to conduct criminal 
investigations, and suggests legal arguments for law enforcement to obtain and use 
CSLI without obtaining a warrant. First, in Part I, this note provides background 
information regarding CSLI. The discussion explains how CSLI is generated and 
briefly explores the history of the acquisition and use of historical and real-time CSLI 
in the courts. Next, Part II of this note argues that under existing precedent, a search 
warrant is not required in order to obtain and use CSLI when the government is 
conducting criminal investigations. The foundation for this argument rests primarily 
on Supreme Court jurisprudence, with added insight provided from state courts and 
other federal courts. 
Finally, Part III of the note argues that even if a search warrant is thought to be 
required in order for law enforcement to obtain CSLI, several exceptions to the 
warrant requirement should apply in the context of CSLI search warrants. 
Specifically, the note discusses the applicability of three exceptions: exigent 
circumstances in hot pursuit of a criminal suspect, exigent circumstances involving 
public safety, and what is termed as the “arrest warrant exception” recognized in 
Payton v. New York,20 which (as originally established) allows the police to conduct 
a warrantless entry of defendant’s residence if the police have an arrest warrant for 
a defendant and have a reason to believe that the defendant is within the home.21 
This note does not discuss the use of GPS in order to locate a phone, except to 
the extent that previous court decisions bear on the analysis of using CSLI. Notably, 
because GPS and CSLI are both capable of persistent and fairly precise tracking of 
 ________________________  
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Sereme, No. 2:11-CR-97-FTM-29SPC, 2012 WL 1757702, at *10 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 27, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:11-CR-97-FTM-29SPC, 2012 WL 1757271 (M.D. Fla. 
May 16, 2012) aff’d sub nom. United States v. Hyppolite, 609 F. App’x 597 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 18. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388–89 (D. Md. 2012), aff’d but criticized, 796 F.3d 332 
(4th Cir. 2015) reh’g en banc granted, No. 12-4659 L, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015). 
 19. Id. at 389. 
 20. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 574 (1980). 
 21. Id. at 603. The definition of the “arrest warrant exception” as outlined here is something of a misnomer 
in that it is not a true exception to the warrant requirement; a warrant is still required in order to make use of this 
“exception.” However, it is unique in that Payton allows an arrest warrant to be used as a search warrant in limited 
circumstances. 
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a phone,22 any ruling on the issue of tracking a phone using CSLI would likely be 
applicable to tracking a phone using GPS, and vice versa.23 Further, this note also 
does not discuss the applicability of state or federal statutes to obtaining and using 
CSLI; ultimately, while a violation of an applicable statute may subject a law 
enforcement agency to civil and criminal liability, many of these statutes explicitly 
rule out application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy.24 
I. BACKGROUND OF CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION 
A. How Cell Site Location Information Works 
To understand the controversy surrounding the use of CSLI, it is important to 
understand exactly how CSLI is generated—in other words, how it works. Cell 
phones use radio waves to communicate between the phone itself and the cellular 
network.25 Service providers maintain radio base stations, called cell sites, spread 
throughout their coverage area.26 When a cell phone is turned on, it connects to a 
local cell site, and then periodically checks the signal strength of the nearest site.27 
When a phone moves away from this first site and is closer to one with a stronger 
signal, the phone is “handed off” to the new cell site.28 Because of this, the service 
provider generally knows which cell site any given phone is associated with at any 
given time.29 The size of the area served by a cell site determines the accuracy of 
CSLI when attempting to determine the location of a connected phone.30 Thus, in 
rural areas, CSLI may not be as useful when attempting to locate someone, since 
there are fewer cell sites that serve larger coverage areas.31 However, in an urban 
area with many cell sites, a phone could potentially be located within a few hundred 
feet due to a smaller coverage area;32 in fact, where microcells33 are present, a phone 
 ________________________  
 22. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone 
Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 495 (2012). 
 23. In fact, at least one court noted that cell site location information allows for location precision 
approaching that of GPS. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (Historical Cell Site Data I), 
747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013). Further, in that case, the court 
used decisions analyzing the use of GPS in order to reach its conclusion about how CSLI can be used, given the 
similarities in what both sources reveal. Id. at 845–46. 
 24. See, e.g., Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 510 (Fla. 2014) (noting that despite a violation of the Florida 
statute governing the acquisition and use of CSLI, the exclusionary rule does not apply; this was the same for 
violations of the federal Stored Communications Act). 
 25. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 20 
(2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Angwin & Thurm, supra note 9, at illus. “Cell-Tower Surveillance.” 
 28. Hearing, supra note 25, at 20. 
 29. Angwin & Thurm, supra note 9, at illus. “Cell-Tower Surveillance.” 
 30. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., Cell Phone Tracking: Trends in Cell Site Precision 1 (2013) [hereinafter 
CDT], https://www.cdt.org/files/file/cell-location-precision.pdf. 
 31. Angwin & Thurm, supra note 9, at illus. “Cell-Tower Surveillance.” 
 32. Id. 
 33. Microcells, picocells, and femtocells are all low-power small cell sites that allow service providers to 
increase their network coverage; they provide service to areas as large as 2000 meters to as small as 10 meters. CDT, 
supra note 30, at 2. 
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could be located as accurately as identifying the individual floor or room within a 
building.34 Thus, especially in urban areas, the accuracy of CSLI can approach GPS-
level precision.35 
Besides providing the general location of a phone as somewhere within the 
coverage area of a cell site, new technology enables service providers to potentially 
locate a phone’s position within the coverage area.36 Using the time the phone arrives 
within the coverage area, as well as the angle at which the signal arrives, can allow 
a phone’s latitude and longitude to be located with a level of accuracy that also 
approaches the accuracy of GPS.37 This calculation can be made even when the 
phone is not actively making a phone call or otherwise communicating with the 
network, so long as it is turned on; however, whether service providers routinely 
track and record this information varies among service providers.38 Unlike GPS, 
CSLI does not depend on any special hardware or programs within the user’s phone; 
rather, it is calculated based on data collected and analyzed at the cell sites 
themselves.39 Thus, the position of every cell phone active in a network could be 
calculated without the knowledge or cooperation of the phone’s owner.40 
Given that the majority of the adult American population owns a cell phone,41 
the ability to determine the location of one of these adults, even without GPS-level 
precision, is a valuable tool for law enforcement. Over time, law enforcement has 
 ________________________  
 34. Angwin & Thurm, supra note 9, at illus. “Cell-Tower Surveillance.” 
 35. CDT, supra note 30, at 4. However, it is important to note that there is a difference between the possibility 
of obtaining data that near-GPS precision location information and actually obtaining that information. The author 
has over ten years of law enforcement experience, and in executing several search warrants to obtain CSLI, he noted 
that historical and real-time CSLI obtained in practice could not be fairly described as containing near-GPS precision 
information. Historical CSLI always includes only the location and sector of the cell tower servicing the phone. 
Even while “pinging” a phone and obtaining real-time CSLI, the author has noted that the locations obtained cover 
several residential units, especially in urban areas. 
 36. Hearing, supra note 25, at 26. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. Many service providers do keep track of CSLI in general because it provides a significant benefit to 
them—namely, it allows them to “identify where new infrastructure is required, where old infrastructure is 
redundant, and how and where their customers use different wireless services.” Id. at 27. Keeping track of this 
information not only “makes good engineering sense,” but also, this information is “extraordinarily valuable for 
network management, marketing, and developing new services.” Id. at 27–28. However, many service providers 
only keep this information, known as “registration data,” for about ten minutes. In re Application of the U.S. for an 
Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 534 (D. Md. 
2011). 
 39. Hearing, supra note 25, at 22. 
 40. Id. This is somewhat misleading, because although the actual calculation of the user’s location may be 
done without the user’s express knowledge or cooperation, the knowledge of how to avoid transmitting one’s 
location via cell phone is “widely known and readily accessible”; the user simply has to turn off his phone. In re 
Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Further, the user knows that 
when the phone is turned on, cell phone providers are calculating and collecting his location information. Id. at 141–
42. It would appear then that a user not knowing the exact moment that his location is calculated is of little 
consequence, as he is knowingly allowing this information to be transmitted and collected by allowing the phone to 
remain on. 
 41. “Roughly nine-in-ten American adults (92%) own a mobile device of some kind.” ANDERSON, supra 
note 7, at 5. In 2015, there were approximately 321 million adults in the United States. See QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00 (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). This means that there 
are approximately 295 million adult cell phone owners in the United States. 
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made frequent use of this tool;42 the types of requests made and a brief history of 
CSLI’s use in criminal investigations completes the picture of the controversy 
surrounding the use of this technological advancement. 
B. The History of Cell Site Location Information in the Courts 
Although cell service providers generate CSLI in the aforementioned manner, 
the information is not simply available to the government for the taking.43 Instead, 
law enforcement can make two different types of CSLI requests through the courts: 
one for historical CSLI and one for real-time (or prospective) CSLI.44 Historical 
CSLI is information that cell phone providers have already collected and logged over 
a specified period of time, at least at the time the request for the information is 
made.45 Real-time CSLI is information that is obtained going forward from the date 
of a court’s order.46 Regardless of whether law enforcement requests real-time or 
historical CSLI, the information obtained is identical in both cases.47 This 
information includes the date and time of communications made and received using 
the phone, the telephone numbers involved in these communications, the cell tower 
to which the phone was connected, and the duration of the call, among other 
information.48 Although the application of information that law enforcement could 
obtain from CSLI is clear, what has historically been unclear is the appropriate 
standard that law enforcement must satisfy in order to obtain it. 
Perhaps the first published decision regarding the government’s use of CSLI was 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Forest.49 In this case, the police (after 
obtaining a court order) used real-time CSLI to track the defendant’s movements 
over the roadways while they also attempted to maintain traditional, visual 
surveillance over the defendant’s vehicle.50 Relying primarily on the fact that the 
defendant’s location was tracked only while he was in public, the court concluded 
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the CSLI was merely a proxy 
for the defendant’s visually observable location.51 
Thereafter, decisions discussing the government’s use of real-time CSLI began 
appearing more frequently in 2005, increasing in frequency through 2010; like 
 ________________________  
 42. One magistrate estimated that “federal courts alone issue 20,000 to 30,000 cellphone tracking orders 
annually.” Angwin & Thurm, supra note 9. 
 43. In order to obtain CSLI information, the government must at least obtain a court order from a judge. 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012). In seeking such an order, the government need not demonstrate probable cause, but instead 
must “offer[] specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of 
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.” Id. § 2703(d). 
 44. United States v. Jones (Jones I), 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 50. Id. at 947–48. 
 51. Id. at 951. 
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Forest, these cases concerned the use of real-time CSLI.52 Although many of these 
cases were decided on statutory grounds,53 some of the cases considered and decided 
whether it was appropriate for the government to obtain or use real-time CSLI after 
considering Fourth Amendment implications.54 For those courts, the rationale 
justifying the decisions on both sides of the issues varied widely. Courts denying 
applications for real-time CSLI have done so generally because of the possibility that 
tracking the location of the cell phone would invade the target’s Fourth Amendment 
rights by tracking the target into a constitutionally protected space.55 Other courts 
reaching the same conclusion did so not necessarily because tracking the phone 
would reveal details about any constitutionally protected space, but instead because 
of an expectation of privacy a target has in the location of his cell phone.56 Courts 
that have approved the use of CSLI without a warrant have done so for several 
reasons; these include the conclusions that a cell phone user does not have any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location data given off by the phone 
voluntarily,57 and CSLI is merely a proxy for a target’s visually observable 
location.58 
Besides acquiring real-time CSLI to locate criminal defendants, the government 
also routinely sought historical CSLI as evidence—commonly to place defendants 
at the scene of a crime.59 Although there were some decisions related to the 
acquisition and use of historical CSLI prior to 2010, the majority of the cases on this 
topic were decided in and after 2010.60 Like their real-time counterparts, decisions 
regarding historical CSLI have articulated varying justifications. Beyond the issues 
involving statutory interpretation and legislative intent, a few courts have held that 
obtaining historical CSLI always requires a warrant because cell phone users have a 
 ________________________  
 52. See, e.g., In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (requesting 
real-time CSLI); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Caller 
Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. (Sealed), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005) (same); In re Application for Pen 
Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth. (Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device), 396 F. Supp. 2d 
747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same). 
 53. See, e.g., In re Applications of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Continued Use of a Pen Register & Trap 
& Trace with Caller Identification Device, 530 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368 (D. Mass. 2007); Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 566; In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 
F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 54. See, e.g., In re Applications of U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code Section 2703(d), 509 F. 
Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 55. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 540 (D. Md. 2011); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing 
the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Pen Register 
& Trap/Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 757). 
 56. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014). 
 57. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 58. Id. at 779 (quoting United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 59. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 501 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). The 
same court noted that CSLI could tell law enforcement whether the suspect was in the general vicinity of a crime. 
Id. at 518. 
 60. See generally Eric Lode, Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track Prospective, Real 
Time, or Historical Position of Possessor of Phone Under Fourth Amendment, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2015) 
(compiling cases that discussed obtaining or using historical CSLI, the vast majority of which were decided after 
2010). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in their location.61 Interestingly, a number of 
courts have determined whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred based 
on the length of time covered by the records sought by the government. If the span 
of the time is relatively short, these courts tend to allow the government to obtain 
historical CSLI.62 In contrast, if the span of time covered is relatively long, then 
courts holding the length of time to be important decline applications for historical 
CSLI.63 However, “[a] majority of courts . . . have concluded that the acquisition of 
historical cell site location data . . . does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, 
regardless of the time period involved.”64 These courts reached this conclusion 
because, like the similar conclusion for real-time CSLI, “people voluntarily convey 
their cell site location data to their cellular providers” and thus have no expectation 
of privacy in that information.65 With the case law on CSLI being in substantial 
disarray, it is difficult to say which rationale will ultimately prevail if and when the 
issue reaches the Supreme Court. However, the Court’s current precedent should 
lead the lower courts to decide that a search warrant is not required in order to obtain 
any form of CSLI, be it historical or real-time. 
II. A SEARCH WARRANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN CELL SITE LOCATION 
INFORMATION 
The rationale for not requiring a search warrant to obtain CSLI is that, simply 
put, when members of law enforcement do obtain CSLI, they are not conducting a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. To start, the Fourth 
Amendment provides for “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and 
generally requires a warrant based upon probable cause to be issued in order for the 
government to conduct a search.66 Early on, in order for government conduct to be 
deemed a search, there must have “been an official search and seizure of his person 
or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical 
invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”67 In Katz v. 
United States however, the Supreme Court rejected the property-based test for 
 ________________________  
 61. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pitt, No. 2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095, at *10 (Mass. Supp. Feb. 23, 2012). 
 62. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d 231, 237 (Mass. 2015) (holding that obtaining six 
hours of historical CSLI without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 63. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 
113, 119–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that obtaining 113 days of historical CSLI without a warrant violates the 
Fourth Amendment); Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d at 238 (holding the same regarding two weeks of historical CSLI data). 
 64. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012). In this case, the court considered 
whether the acquisition of two different periods of historical CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment, one period being 
221 days. Id. at 387. Further, the view that the time period covered by the records sought is irrelevant to the Fourth 
Amendment analysis finds support in Jones II; there, the Court rejected the idea that the duration of government 
monitoring, in addition to the nature of the crime being investigated, was relevant to the analysis of whether a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred. Jones II, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
 65. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 389. 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 67. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967). Although a physical trespass is no longer required in order to constitute a search, a trespass still is 
sufficient to establish a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Jones II, 132 S. Ct. at 950. 
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determining when a search occurred by recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”68 Instead, the Court held that the standard for 
determining whether a search occurred is a two-pronged test: “first that a person 
ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”69 If this test 
is not met, no search has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.70 
While this test provided some answers on how to deal with potential searches 
and seizures that did not involve a physical trespass, it also created questions—most 
importantly, what expectations of privacy are reasonable? Providing guidance to 
answer this question, the Court has explained that a search or seizure is evaluated 
“under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the 
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree 
to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”71 
Further, “there is a ‘strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of 
Congress, especially when it turns on what is “reasonable”’” with regards to searches 
and seizures.72 Beyond this general guidance, the Court has provided a solid 
foundation for the conclusion that obtaining both historical and real-time CSLI, 
pursuant to a court order not based on probable cause, does not offend the Fourth 
Amendment. 
A. Historical Cell Site Location Information 
With regard to historical CSLI, one case in particular explains why an 
expectation of privacy in this information is not reasonable, and thus the government 
is not conducting a search when obtaining it. In Smith v. Maryland, the Court 
examined a case in which the police installed a pen register at the offices of a 
telephone company in order to obtain the phone numbers dialed from the defendant’s 
home in connection with a criminal investigation.73 The government then used the 
evidence obtained from the pen register, as well as other evidence, to convict Smith 
for robbery.74 In upholding Smith’s conviction, the Court said it was doubtful 
that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in 
the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must 
“convey” phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is 
through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are 
completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone 
 ________________________  
 68. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 69. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 70. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (holding that the expectation of privacy 
in garbage left on the side of the public street is not objectively reasonable and consequently concluding there was 
no search under the Fourth Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (holding there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regards to observations into residential backyard from 1000 feet in the air). 
 71. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). 
 72. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976). 
 73. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 74. Id. at 738. 
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company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers 
they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their 
monthly bills.75 
The Court then pointed out that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”76 This is true even if the 
information is being voluntarily disclosed by a person to a third party on an 
assumption that it will only be used for a limited purpose and is being given in 
confidence to the third party.77 Importantly, when Smith was decided, “telephone 
records necessarily showed exactly where the user was—his home—at the time of 
the call, as the user’s telephone number was tied to a precise address.”78 
The same rationale that led to the conclusion in Smith is easily applied to CSLI. 
In deciding that applications for historical CSLI should have been granted, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that 
[a] cell service subscriber, like a telephone user, understands that his 
cell phone must send a signal to a nearby cell tower in order to 
wirelessly connect his call. Cell phone users recognize that, if their 
phone cannot pick up a signal (or “has no bars”), they are out of the 
range of their service provider’s network of towers. . . . Even if this 
cell phone-to-tower signal transmission was not “common 
knowledge,” [there is] evidence that cell service providers’ and 
subscribers’ contractual terms of service and providers’ privacy 
policies expressly state that a provider uses a subscriber’s location 
information to route his cell phone calls. In addition, these 
documents inform subscribers that the providers not only use the 
information, but collect it. Finally, they make clear that providers 
will turn over these records to government officials if served with a 
court order. Cell phone users, therefore, understand that their service 
providers record their location information when they use their 
phones at least to the same extent that the landline users in Smith 
understood that the phone company recorded the numbers they 
dialed.79 
 ________________________  
 75. Id. at 742. 
 76. Id. at 743–44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 
U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 449 (1963)). 
 77. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443). 
 78. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 79. In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data (Historical Cell Site Data II), 724 
F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). See also In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 
977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 146 (E.D.N.Y 2013) (“Cell phone customers similarly convey geolocation data to their 
telephone carriers, and cannot possibly labor under the belief that their location is somehow kept secret from 
telecommunication carriers and other third parties.”). The same case also discusses the media attention, at that time, 
given to the fact that the location of cell phones could be tracked, fairly easily, by businesses and members of the 
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In addition to noting this “common knowledge” among cell phone users, the court 
also pointed out that the ownership and use of a cell phone is entirely voluntary, as 
is the choice to obtain cell phone service from a provider that chooses to keep such 
records.80 Armed with these facts, the Fifth Circuit easily concluded that CSLI is a 
“business record[] and should be analyzed under that line of Supreme Court 
precedent.”81 
Proponents of a warrant requirement for historical CSLI advance one main 
argument: the provision of historical CSLI to members of law enforcement allows 
them to obtain a “detailed and intimate picture” of a target’s comings and goings—
which invades the individual’s right to privacy.82 However, not only does this 
argument attempt to sidestep the aforementioned relevant—and binding—Supreme 
Court precedent, it is flawed in its own right. Historical CSLI does not paint the 
intimate picture of a target’s comings and goings as claimed.83 The precision of 
historical CSLI depends largely on the equipment available in the area,84 because 
while it may be possible to calculate a person’s position with near-GPS precision,85 
in most cases historical CSLI only identifies the tower that was used to route a phone 
call.86 Even if the location is further refined by identifying the sector from which a 
phone call originated, the user could still be anywhere within the covered sector.87 
Thus, historical CSLI does not allow the government to gain the “intimate portrait 
of person, social, religious, medical, and other activities and interactions” claimed 
by those who would advance this argument.88 This is true regardless of the amount 
of time covered by the government’s request for records.89 
Even if obtaining historical CSLI is a search because of the expectation of 
privacy, a warrant is still not necessarily required; instead, a court must determine 
the reasonableness of the search by balancing the intrusion on individual privacy 
with the need to promote legitimate governmental interests.90 With regard to 
individual privacy, as previously established, there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the business records kept by a third party.91 Further, historical CSLI does 
not reveal the content of any conversation being transmitted through the phone and 
does not pinpoint the location of the user.92 Additionally, safeguards for personal 
 ________________________  
public. Id. at 139–41. In particular, the court discusses the “Stalker App,” which aggregated geolocation data and 
personal information that was already available to the public, conveyed there by cell phone users. Id. at 141. 
 80. Historical Cell Site Data II, 724 F.3d at 613. 
 81. Id. at 615. 
 82. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119–
20  (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 83. Davis, 785 F.3d at 515. 
 84. See supra Part I.A for a discussion on the different levels of accuracy of CSLI in rural and urban areas. 
 85. See supra Part I.A for a discussion on new technology that can allow a phone to be located with near-
GPS precision. 
 86. Davis, 785 F.3d at 515. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (noting that neither one day of historical CSLI procured in compliance with the law, nor sixty-seven 
days, violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 90. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). 
 91. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976). 
 92. Davis, 785 F.3d at 517.  
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privacy are already in place; in order to ensure that the records sought actually serve 
legitimate government interests, the government must offer “specific and articulable 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the historical CSLI 
sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation,” and this 
information must be provided to a detached and neutral magistrate prior to the 
issuance of a court order.93 
Given the minimal intrusion on individual privacy, the judicial oversight 
available to prevent an arbitrary invasion of privacy, and the presumed 
reasonableness of government action that complies with federal law,94 the only factor 
left to assess is whether the information sought serves a compelling governmental 
interest. Law enforcement agencies nationwide use historical CSLI to investigate a 
wide range of crimes, including kidnapping, murder, robbery, rape, and other serious 
offenses.95 Certainly, society has a compelling interest in both capturing those who 
commit these heinous crimes as well as quickly eliminating from suspicion those 
who are innocent of any wrongdoing.96 Historical CSLI allows the police to fulfill 
this interest because it allows investigators to determine whether an individual was 
at the scene of the crime.97 After carefully weighing all of these factors, even if 
obtaining historical CSLI was a search as claimed, this search is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment and a warrant is not required.98 
This result makes sense in light of other records containing personal information 
available to the government without probable cause. For example, historical CSLI is 
certainly no more revealing (or intrusive on individual privacy) than medical records, 
which are available pursuant to a subpoena after the government shows their 
relevance to a criminal investigation.99 In addition, the police can obtain a wide 
variety of records that could allow them to paint an “intimate picture” of a person’s 
life via subpoena, including credit card statements, bank statements, purchase orders, 
and invoices that would reveal where a person spends his money and what he spends 
it on.100 The law actually provides more protection for citizens with regards to 
historical CSLI because, unlike an ordinary subpoena, law enforcement officials can 
only obtain historical CSLI after appearing before a judge.101 In light of all this, 
without regard to whether obtaining historical CSLI is a search, when the 
government obtains this information without a warrant, it simply cannot be held to 
violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 ________________________  
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 94. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976). 
 95. Davis, 785 F.3d at 518 (listing several categories of crimes and citing case examples). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., Ussery v. State, 654 So. 2d 561, 561–62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Notably, the § 2703(d) court 
order to obtain CSLI is the equivalent of a judicial subpoena. Davis, 785 F.3d at 517. 
 100. Davis, 785 F.3d at 506. 
 101. Id. Ordinarily, the government can compel a witness to “produce any books, papers, documents, data, or 
other objects the subpoena designates” by simply filling in the blanks on a subpoena issued by the clerk without any 
involvement from a judge. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a), (c)(1). 
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B. Real-Time Cell Site Location Information 
As with historical CSLI, the third-party doctrine outlined in United States v. 
Miller102 dictates that when the government obtains real-time CSLI from cell service 
providers, it is not conducting a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.103 Simply put, a cell phone user does not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the location data given off by his phone104 because the user understands 
that his location must be conveyed as part and parcel to the provision of cell phone 
service.105 Accordingly, when the government obtains a court order without probable 
cause to acquire real-time CSLI, it is not violating the Fourth Amendment.106 
Besides support from the third-party doctrine, some courts have concluded that 
obtaining real-time CSLI without a warrant supported by probable cause does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment when the information revealed only describes the 
user’s public movements.107 In making this conclusion, these courts have relied 
primarily on two Supreme Court cases—United States v. Knotts108 and United States 
v. Karo.109 
In Knotts, the police were investigating a group of men suspected of 
manufacturing drugs, and placed a tracking device inside of a container of 
chloroform that was later purchased by one of the defendants.110 The police used 
visual surveillance as well as signals from the tracking device to follow the container, 
which was being transported in a vehicle, to a cabin occupied by one of the 
defendants.111 In deciding that the use of the tracking device did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court pointed to the fact that, while on the public roadways, 
the defendants could have been observed by law enforcement officials conducting 
traditional surveillance and simply following their vehicle.112 Accordingly, there was 
no legitimate expectation of privacy invaded by the government.113 
Later, in Karo, the government placed a tracking device inside of a container 
that was given to a criminal defendant and then used that device while it was inside 
of a private residence to confirm its location there; this confirmation was used to 
 ________________________  
 102. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 103. See supra Part II.A for a full discussion on the application of the third-party doctrine to historical CSLI; 
for the purposes of this section, only a brief overview of the justifying rationale is provided. The applicability of the 
third-party doctrine makes sense for real-time CSLI, in part, because the information gained from real-time CSLI is 
the same as information obtained from historical CSLI, and both are business records kept by cell phone providers. 
Jones I, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 104. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 105. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 146 (E.D.N.Y 2013). 
 106. See id. at 147; In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records and 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (reaching 
the same conclusion). 
 107. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 781 (holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time CSLI 
where police tracked a cell phone that was voluntarily used while traveling on public highways). 
 108. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 109. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 110. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 285. 
 113. Id. 
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obtain a search warrant for the residence.114 The Court noted that the monitoring of 
the tracking device occurred inside of a private residence and held that even though 
it was “less intrusive than a full-scale search,”115 this activity qualified as a search 
for which a warrant was required.116 Combining the holdings of Knotts and Karo, 
the government is free to conduct electronic surveillance of a subject while he or she 
travels on public thoroughfares, but it cannot use this kind of electronic surveillance 
to monitor the inside of a private residence.117 
Critics, however, argue that “because cell phone users tend to take their phones 
with them everywhere, officers could not know in advance whether the tracking 
would follow the suspect into clearly protected areas” like a home.118 Rather than 
impose the risk of a Fourth Amendment violation on the people, these courts impose 
the warrant requirement on the government.119 This argument makes sense, since the 
Fourth Amendment cannot afford any protection to the people if a violation cannot 
be prevented before it occurs.120 This rationale also finds some support in Karo, 
where the government argued it would be forced to obtain a warrant for all electronic 
surveillance cases because “[it has] no way of knowing in advance whether the 
beeper will be transmitting its signals from inside private premises.”121 Although the 
Court did not find the government’s argument compelling, it did not seem to pass 
judgment on such a requirement.122 
However, the same case undermines the entire line of reasoning justifying this 
opposition; when the monitoring of the tracking device was found to be a Fourth 
Amendment violation, the Court simply struck it from the warrant and then evaluated 
whether the remaining information justified the issuance of the warrant.123 Further, 
the Court also said, “we have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, 
invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. . . . 
It is the exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment, not their mere existence.”124 The monitoring of real-time CSLI 
definitely has the potential to follow a cell phone user into his home, but this 
potential is not enough to impose the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.125 
Admittedly, it would behoove the government to obtain a warrant if it relies on the 
 ________________________  
 114. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–10. 
 115. Id. at 715. 
 116. Id. at 718. 
 117. This is, of course, subject to the holding in Jones II, which prohibits the government from performing 
this type of surveillance if it involves a physical trespass. Jones II, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 118. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 518 (Fla. 2014) (citing In re Application of the U.S. for an Order 
Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 540 (D. Md. 2011)). 
 119. See, e.g., Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 524.  
 120. Id. at 519. 
 121. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at 719–21. 
 124. Id. at 712. 
 125. Despite this, it is equally important to point out that the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent 
unlawful police action rather than simply redress it after the fact. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981) 
(citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969)). 
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reasoning of Knotts and Karo because without one, “the government acts at its peril” 
and risks the suppression of evidence.126 
Another argument for a warrant requirement relating to real-time CSLI is that it 
converts the user’s cell phone into a tracking device, which demands compliance 
with rules and statutes that require a warrant to be issued upon probable cause.127 
However, acquiring real-time CSLI does not turn a user’s cell phone into a tracking 
device; in fact, “construing ‘tracking device’ to encompass a cell phone is simply 
illogical and unworkable.”128 While it is true that a federal statute defines a tracking 
device as “an electronic or mechanical device [that] permits the tracking of the 
movement of a person or object,”129 this confuses a device installed for the primary 
purpose of tracking movement with something that, incidental to its primary purpose, 
can be tracked or traced.130 Moreover, interpreting tracking devices to encompass 
items like cell phones would have absurd results. Under this broad interpretation, 
an individual travelling by bicycle, leaving tire tracks in a muddy 
field; an automobile taillight, which could permit officers to follow 
a car at night; or the transmitter of a pirate radio station, the signal 
from which may be located via triangulation, would each constitute 
an “electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of 
the movement of a person or object.”131 
Even if obtaining real-time CSLI did convert a cell phone into a “tracking 
device,” there would still be no Fourth Amendment violation. “The Government 
does not require a member of the public to own or carry a phone,”132 so any phone 
that a user chooses to carry is voluntarily carried, much like the container voluntarily 
accepted in Knotts. Accordingly, tracking a phone while in public would not be a 
Fourth Amendment violation;133 only tracking the phone within a private area, such 
as a home, would require a warrant.134 
One final argument for a warrant requirement, and perhaps the most persuasive, 
has found much support and is best outlined in Tracey v. State.135 There, the court 
embraced the argument that real-time CSLI may follow the user into his or her home, 
but also argued against the Court’s more lenient rules established in Smith and 
 ________________________  
 126. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Caller 
Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. (Sealed), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. 2005). 
 127. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537 (D. Md. 2011); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace 
Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 128. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 149 (E.D.N.Y 2013). 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). 
 130. Smartphone Geolocation Data, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 149. 
 131. Id. at 149. 
 132. Historical Cell Site Data II, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 133. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 134. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984). 
 135. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014).  
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Miller.136 Relying on the concerns expressed in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in 
United States v. Jones, the court in Tracey pointed out that 
[s]imply because the cell phone user knows or should know that his 
cell phone gives off signals that enable the service provider to detect 
its location for call routing purposes, and which enable cell phone 
applications to operate for navigation, weather reporting, and other 
purposes, does not mean that the user is consenting to use of that 
location information by third parties for any other unrelated 
purposes. While a person may voluntarily convey personal 
information to a business or other entity for personal purposes, such 
disclosure cannot reasonably be considered to be disclosure for all 
purposes to third parties not involved in that transaction.137 
Like the argument regarding historical CSLI, the Tracey court was concerned that 
real-time CSLI would “reveal a detailed and intimate picture of the user’s life.”138 
This assertion overlooks two important facts. First, the extent of “information made 
available is not a factor in the application of the” third-party doctrine.139 Just like 
credit card records, real-time CSLI may in fact provide information beyond just the 
contents of the records themselves.140 But the government can obtain many records 
that could allow it to paint this same “intimate” picture with just a subpoena—no 
warrant (or judicial oversight) required.141 In the case of CSLI, legislative bodies 
have “required more before the government can obtain telephone records from a 
third-party business” because review by a detached and neutral magistrate is required 
prior to the issuance of a court order.142 Clearly then, the ability to paint an “intimate 
picture” is not enough to demand that the government get a warrant before obtaining 
real-time CSLI. 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, 
[i]t may well be that the vast expansion of data provided by 
individuals to third parties—along with a widespread heightened 
concern regarding the privacy of that data—points to a need for 
reexamining the third-party[] doctrine. Any such reexamination, 
however, is properly within the province of the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court gave us the third-party[] doctrine, and if that 
 ________________________  
 136. See generally id. at 519–20 (arguing that, in the digital age, not all information given to third parties is 
exempt from Fourth Amendment protection). 
 137. Id. at 522. 
 138. Id. at 523. 
 139. Id. at 528 (Canady, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., Ussery v. State, 654 So. 2d 561, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing the government to 
obtain medical records pursuant to a subpoena); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 506 & n.9 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(noting that “[t]he government routinely issues subpoenas to third parties to produce a wide variety of business 
records, such as credit card statements, bank statements, hotel bills, purchase orders, and billing invoices” that can 
show the location and time of purchases as well as reveal “intimate details of daily life”). 
 142. Davis, 785 F.3d at 506. 
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doctrine is to be judicially altered, it should only be altered by the 
Supreme Court.143 
For better or for worse, because the Court has provided us with the third-party 
doctrine, and because the government’s acquisition of both historical and real-time 
CSLI without a warrant is justified by this doctrine, until the Court (or a legislative 
body) requires a warrant for this data, obtaining it via a court order without probable 
cause does not offend the Fourth Amendment. 
III. EXCEPTIONS TO A WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR CELL SITE LOCATION 
INFORMATION 
Even though there should not be a warrant requirement for the government to 
obtain CSLI, what is clear currently is that the courts have differing opinions on the 
matter;144 given this, the government may lose critical evidence if it obtains CSLI 
without first getting a search warrant based on probable cause.145 Further, even if the 
lower courts were to agree that probable cause is not required for this information, 
the Supreme Court has yet to rule precisely on the issue, and may in fact modify the 
third-party doctrine outlined in Miller and Smith, as suggested by Justice 
Sotomayor,146 or may make a rule specifically related to obtaining CSLI all together, 
separate from this doctrine.147  
Despite any future ruling that may dub the acquisition of CSLI a search, these 
searches could still be reasonable in the absence of a warrant if they fall within one 
of the carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.148 Although other 
exceptions to the warrant requirement may apply, three exceptions in particular seem 
most applicable if the government is seeking to obtain and use CSLI; these 
exceptions are exigent circumstances for hot pursuit, exigent circumstances for 
public safety, and the “arrest warrant exception.” Each of these exceptions is 
discussed in turn. 
A. Exigent Circumstances—Hot Pursuit 
The first of these applicable exceptions allows for the police to make warrantless 
entries when they are in “hot pursuit” (sometimes referred to as “fresh pursuit”) of a 
 ________________________  
 143. Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 528 (Canady, J., dissenting). 
 144. See supra Part II.B for a general discussion of the differing court opinions on whether and when a warrant 
is required for both historical and real-time CSLI. 
 145. See, e.g., Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 526 (“Because probable cause did not support the search in this case, and 
no warrant based on probable cause authorized the use of Tracey’s real time cell site location information to track 
him, the evidence obtained as a result of that search was subject to suppression.”). 
 146. See Jones II, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that “it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties[]”). 
 147. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (holding that a warrant is required before a 
search of a cell phone incident to arrest, despite the fact that a person and his effects have been generally held to be 
subject to search incident to arrest). 
 148. Id. at 2482. 
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criminal suspect. In Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,149 the Court considered 
the validity of the government’s warrantless search of a home. After Hayden 
committed a robbery, he was seen and followed to his house by witnesses, and after 
the police were notified they proceeded to Hayden’s house, arriving “within 
minutes” of learning he was there.150 The police entered the house and began 
searching for Hayden; along with him, they found evidence of Hayden’s crime inside 
of the residence.151 Here, the Court held that the warrantless entry into Hayden’s 
home and the warrantless search for Hayden himself were both valid because the 
Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement officials to delay their 
investigation if doing so puts them or the public in danger.152 Although the majority 
opinion did not explicitly say so, Justice Fortas’s concurring opinion recognized the 
majority’s decision was authorizing government searches “in the course of ‘hot 
pursuit.’”153 
In United States v. Santana, police established probable cause to arrest a woman 
for a drug offense after conducting an undercover drug transaction.154 When the 
police arrived at the woman’s house, they saw her standing in the doorway to the 
home; however, upon realizing the police were present, the woman retreated into her 
residence.155 The police immediately followed her, entering the woman’s home in 
the process, and arrested her.156 Recognizing this as a case of “true ‘hot pursuit,’” 
the Court held that the warrantless entry into the woman’s home was governed by 
Hayden and was thus valid.157 
Hayden and Santana stand for the proposition that the police may enter a home, 
the most sacred of premises, without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a 
criminal suspect (against whom they have established probable cause to arrest), and 
the delay of obtaining a warrant would endanger their lives or the lives of others and 
lead to the escape of the perpetrator158 or allow for the destruction of evidence.159 
This is easily applied in the context of CSLI by simply substituting the user’s cell 
phone for his home; this would allow the government to obtain CSLI from a cell 
provider without a warrant when it has probable cause to believe that evidence of a 
crime will be found at the location to be searched, and the delay of obtaining a 
warrant160 would put lives at risk, lead to the destruction of evidence, or lead to the 
 ________________________  
 149. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 295–96 (1967). 
 150. Id. at 297. 
 151. Id. at 298. 
 152. Id. at 298–99. 
 153. Id. at 310 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
 154. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 39–40 (1976). 
 155. Id. at 40. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 42–43. 
 158. See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299 (defining the scope of the warrantless entry and search justified during hot 
pursuit to be as broad as necessary in order to prevent resistance or escape by the suspect). 
 159. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 (holding the warrantless entry into a home justified during hot pursuit 
because there was “a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence”). 
 160. One district court noted that, on the facts presented in the case, obtaining a warrant for CSLI could take 
approximately six hours, notwithstanding the “several days or weeks thereafter before the cell phone location data 
would be provided by the cellular service provider.” United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 363 (D. Vt. 
2013). Under these circumstances, the requirement that there be a significant delay appears to be met as a matter of 
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escape of the cell phone user suspected of the crime.161 In fact, several lower courts 
have applied this exception to CSLI cases with results that are consistent with the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
In State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, officers were investigating the stabbing death of a 
man that had occurred early one morning.162 Just before noon on the same day, the 
police learned that the suspect had borrowed a vehicle and may have been seeking 
to leave the state—possibly even the country.163 Some time after noon on the same 
day, the police sought to track the suspect’s cell phone, submitting a request to the 
cell service provider outlining the exigent circumstances present; specifically, that 
they were looking for a homicide suspect who was “armed and dangerous” and may 
be looking to “flee the state or the country to avoid prosecution.”164 Later in the 
afternoon, law enforcement was able to obtain the tracking information for the 
suspect, which placed him in Arkansas (three states away).165 The suspect’s vehicle 
information was given to the police in Arkansas around 5:43 p.m., and the suspect 
was located and taken into custody around 6:11 p.m.—or approximately twenty-
eight minutes later.166 Assuming for the sake of argument that obtaining CSLI from 
the suspect’s phone was a search, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this search 
would not violate the Fourth Amendment because it fell within the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.167 In fact, the police in this case 
“had their pick of three exigent circumstances”—the threat to the safety of others, 
the risk that the suspect would destroy evidence, and the likelihood that the suspect 
would flee the country.168  
The Subdiaz-Osorio case met the requirements of exigent circumstances while 
in hot pursuit because, although the crime itself happened much earlier in the 
morning, the police were actively investigating the crime as soon as they were 
informed of it and they acted on the information they had without delay, including 
submitting the request to the cell service provider shortly after obtaining the 
suspect’s cell phone number.169 Further, there was sufficient evidence from which 
 ________________________  
course when attempting to obtain CSLI from a cell service provider. See id. (noting that after several days or weeks, 
the data might have forensic value but could not be used to remedy the exigent circumstances presented). 
 161. See generally State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 N.W.2d 748, 770 (Wis. 2014) (requiring the government to 
establish probable cause that evidence will be found at the location to be searched, and that there are exigent 
circumstances in the form of threats to safety, risk of losing evidence, and likelihood that suspect will flee). 
 162. Id. at 754. 
 163. Id. at 754–55. 
 164. Id. at 756. 
 165. Id. at 757. 
 166. Id. at 757. 
 167. Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 N.W.2d at 768. 
 168. Id. at 770. 
 169. Id. at 756–58. Exact times are not given, but the factual background indicates that the witness who 
provided the suspect’s cell phone number was interviewed from “around 10 a.m. . . . until about 12 p.m.” and that 
the police began seeking CSLI from the suspect’s phone “[s]ometime after 12 p.m.” Id. at 754–55. This suggests 
that the police could have began seeking CSLI within the span of a few minutes, but also that it could have taken 
over two hours for the police to act on the information received from the witness. Interestingly, the police obtained 
a search warrant to search the suspect’s home, and a detective indicated that authoring a search warrant and having 
it signed by a judge “usually takes between two and three hours.” Id. at 756. On these facts, it is at least possible 
that the police could have obtained a search warrant to get the suspect’s CSLI if they received his cell phone 
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the police could establish probable cause to search the suspect’s phone to obtain 
evidence of the murder and support a finding that exigent circumstances existed and 
that a delay would jeopardize lives, potential evidence, and the successful 
apprehension of the suspect.170 
Although it may seem easy to establish exigent circumstances, the courts have 
not accepted all assertions of exigent circumstances by law enforcement in the 
context of CSLI. For example, in Herring v. State, the court noted that there was at 
least some justification for a finding of exigent circumstances, since Herring may 
have been armed and that a delay in his apprehension could jeopardize the lives of 
other officers as well as those of the public.171 However, the police obtained 
Herring’s cell phone information at 11:15 p.m. and the police did not contact the cell 
phone provider to obtain CSLI for Herring’s phone until 1:52 a.m. the next day—a 
delay of over two-and-a-half hours.172 This large gap of time, coupled with no 
explanation as to why officers could not have obtained a search warrant during this 
delay, was enough to defeat a finding of exigent circumstances.173 
In keeping with these cases, in order to obtain admissible evidence when they 
seek to act under exigent circumstances in hot pursuit, the police should act on the 
information they receive regarding a suspect’s cell phone without unreasonable 
delay; any delays in acting on this information should be well documented to support 
the necessary assertion that there was no time to obtain a CSLI search warrant.174 In 
addition, the police should indicate how long it usually takes to draft a warrant for 
CSLI, to have that warrant signed, to serve it on a cell service provider, and to have 
the provider respond with that information; this information could be crucial to a 
decision on whether exigent circumstances existed.175 Finally, the police must be 
able to establish that a delay in obtaining CSLI from a cell service provider would 
either jeopardize their safety or the safety of another person, create a risk of the 
destruction of evidence of the crime that they are investigating, or allow the suspect 
to evade apprehension; this could be as simple as providing facts supporting an 
assertion that the suspect may be armed and dangerous, is suspected of a crime of 
violence, may still be in possession of evidence of the crime, and could be seeking 
 ________________________  
information at the start of the witness interview; however, this does not take into account the response time of the 
cell service provider. 
 170. See Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 N.W.2d at 770. 
 171. Herring v. State, 168 So. 3d 240, 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
 172. Id. at 242. 
 173. Id. at 244 (explaining that “the State failed to present testimony to establish that officers could not have 
obtained a warrant during the 2.5 hour period at issue”). As noted previously, it could take several hours simply to 
draft the search warrant to obtain CSLI, and then several days or weeks to get a response. United States v. Caraballo, 
963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 363 (D. Vt. 2013). Thus, the problem may not necessarily have been with the amount of time 
that passed before law enforcement conducted the search, but rather the fact that no information was presented to 
justify the amount of time that passed between obtaining Herring’s cell phone information and actually conducting 
the search. 
 174. See Herring, 168 So. 3d at 244 (quoting Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 1977)) (“[I]f 
time to get a warrant exists, the enforcement agency must use that time to obtain a warrant.”). 
 175. Compare Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (holding that exigent circumstances existed, relying in part 
on the fact that it could take weeks to complete the warrant process) with Herring, 168 So. 3d at 244 (holding that 
exigent circumstances did not exist because officers did not attempt to obtain warrant and did not explain why they 
could not obtain a warrant in two-and-a-half hours). 
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to flee the jurisdiction.176 Complying with these requirements, the police should be 
able to successfully obtain and use CSLI and avoid suppression of the resulting 
evidence at trial. 
B. Exigent Circumstances—Public Safety 
The next applicable exception—exigent circumstances for concern of public 
safety177—is a close cousin of the exception surrounding hot pursuit. However, it is 
distinct in that, while the hot pursuit doctrine requires the police to establish probable 
cause for a crime, among other requirements,178 the public safety doctrine requires 
only that the police “have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an 
occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.”179 This rule 
was announced in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, where the Court considered the 
warrantless entry into a residence during a police response to a loud party.180 After 
officers arrived at the residence, they heard an altercation occurring inside the 
residence, entered the backyard to see juveniles drinking beer there and observed 
what appeared to be the beginning of a fight inside the residence.181 The police then 
entered the residence to quell the violence;182 on these facts, the Court found that the 
officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing an injured adult may need 
help and that future violence was imminent, and held that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation.183 
The Court affirmed this holding in Michigan v. Fisher, where officers responded 
to a man “going crazy” inside his own residence.184 When the police arrived, they 
saw the man’s vehicle and house damaged, with broken glass lying around, and 
blood on one of the doors to the house and on the vehicle.185 Looking through a 
window, the police could see the man inside his house screaming and throwing 
things; the man appeared to have been injured, but refused to tell police whether he 
needed medical attention.186 When the police entered the man’s residence, he pointed 
a gun at one of the officers; he was subsequently arrested and charged with assault 
 ________________________  
 176. See State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 N.W.2d 748, 770–72 (Wis. 2014) (finding exigent circumstances to 
obtain CSLI when the police provided facts supporting all of these assertions); United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 
2d 1315, 1323 (D. Utah 2013) (finding exigent circumstances to obtain CSLI when detective had knowledge that 
defendant was known to be violent, believed defendant to be armed and dangerous, and reasonably believed that a 
robbery would be committed by the defendant in the future). 
 177. This is also referred to as the emergency aid exception. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009). 
 178. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (approving warrantless entry when police had 
probable cause to arrest defendant prior to making entry into her home to arrest her, and noting that the same occurred 
in Hayden). 
 179. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006). 
 180. Id. at 406. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 406–07. Interestingly, Justice Stevens joined the unanimous opinion, but wrote separately to explain 
that he felt the Court’s opinion simply restated “well-settled rules of federal law” and that “it [was] hard to imagine 
the outcome was ever in doubt[,]” so much so that he would have denied certiorari on this case. Id. at 407–09 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 184. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 45 (2009). 
 185. Id. at 45–46. 
 186. Id. at 46. 
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with a deadly weapon.187 The Court applied Stuart and held that law enforcement 
was able to invoke exigent circumstances involving public safety to make a 
warrantless entry into the man’s home because it was reasonable to believe that he 
hurt himself and needed help or that he was about to hurt or had already hurt someone 
else.188 
This exception is easily adapted to apply to CSLI; in fact, the Stored 
Communications Act specifically allows cell service providers to divulge the 
contents of any communication to be disclosed to any government entity “if the 
provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or 
serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of 
communications relating to the emergency.”189 In situations where members of law 
enforcement are seeking CSLI, they would provide information sufficient for the cell 
service provider to meet the standard announced in Stuart, and the provider would 
then be able to release the information to the police.190 Currently, there are no cases 
that discuss the applicability of the exigent circumstances for public safety exception 
in the context of CSLI—perhaps because in cases where it has been used, the parties 
(or the courts) have recognized that it is appropriate under both the Stored 
Communications Act and the seemingly common-sense notions behind the public 
safety exception.191 However, real-life examples show the straightforward 
application of, and the necessity for, such an exception as applied to CSLI. 
In one incident, the police received a phone call late one Sunday evening from a 
woman screaming for help and begging to be released from a vehicle; the call was 
abruptly cut short.192 Acting quickly, a police dispatcher contacted the woman’s cell 
service provider and obtained the name of the phone’s owner, as well as the location 
of the phone.193 Using this location information, as well as other information 
obtained from conducting research on the phone’s owner, allowed police to locate 
the victim “within moments” and rescue her from her kidnapper.194 Simply having 
someone asking for help and wanting to get out of a vehicle may provide some 
suspicion that criminal activity is at hand, but likely falls short of the probable cause 
required for the exigent circumstances in hot pursuit exception.195 Further, based 
solely on that brief contact, it would be hard to say with certainty that the incident 
 ________________________  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 49. 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) (2012). The same law also allows for subscriber information to be obtained under 
the same circumstances. § 2702(c)(4). States have also enacted statutes that allow for the same disclosures under 
similar circumstances. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 934.22(2)(f), (3)(a) (2015). 
 190. Past cases suggest that the cell provider would receive the information from law enforcement via a faxed 
form on which the police certify facts that justify a claim of exigent circumstances, and thereafter would provide the 
requested information to law enforcement. See State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 N.W.2d 748, 756 (Wis. 2014); United 
States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 345–47 (D. Vt. 2013). 
 191. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 407–09 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 192. Julie Manganis, Police Credit Dispatcher with Locating Kidnap Victim, SALEM NEWS (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.salemnews.com/news/local_news/police-credit-dispatcher-with-locating-
kidnapvictimarticle_464b9723-8160-5804-bead-331cd218bf93.html. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the requirements of the exception for exigent circumstances while 
the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect. 
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involved “danger of death or serious physical injury” as required under the Stored 
Communications Act, at least if the language of the statute is construed strictly.196 
However, under the public safety exception, a person calling 911 and screaming for 
help would seem at least as serious as a man who had a “cut on his hand” but was 
refusing to communicate with police.197 And since the exception does not require 
“ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury” but instead only “‘an 
objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that medical assistance was needed[] or 
persons were in danger,” it would certainly cover the scenario described above.198 
Clearly then, the exception for exigent circumstances for public safety, as applied to 
CSLI, has its place as a useful tool for allowing law enforcement to safeguard lives 
in a broad range of emergency situations.199 
In order to make use of this exception, members of law enforcement should 
carefully document the facts and circumstances that lead them to believe there is 
someone who is in need of medical assistance or is in legitimate danger of serious 
injury.200 In the context of obtaining CSLI, this would most likely come from the 
contents of a cell phone call to a 911 operator from a person in distress (like the 
example above), a report from family members or close friends about a missing and 
endangered loved one, or some similar situation. Once obtained and documented, 
this information should be immediately reported to a cell service provider, who can 
then provide the police with the location information necessary to locate and assist 
the citizen in need.201 Complying with these requirements, law enforcement should 
be able to avoid any Fourth Amendment violations. 
C. The “Arrest Warrant Exception” 
Although not as straightforward as the public safety exception, the “arrest 
warrant exception” is an equally valuable tool that would allow the police to 
safeguard the public by locating and apprehending wanted criminals. Born in Payton, 
this exception allows an officer armed with an arrest warrant “to enter a dwelling in 
which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”202 
Applying this to CSLI, one might present a rule that would allow the police to obtain 
CSLI for the subject of an arrest warrant, since the entry into a suspect’s home is 
 ________________________  
 196. §§ 2702(b)(8), (c)(4).  
 197. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 46 (2009). 
 198. Id. at 49. 
 199. It does not appear that any case has interpreted whether the requirement that there be a “danger of death 
or serious physical injury,” §§ 2702(b)(8), (c)(4), has the same meaning as a requirement for “an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that [someone] is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury,” 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006). However, if the statute were to be interpreted to require the same 
proof as that required in Stuart, then admittedly there would be no need for a public safety exception for CSLI, 
except perhaps that the exception would allow the police to demand or seize the information whereas the statute 
allows service providers to voluntarily disclose the information (and thus they could choose not to do so). 
 200. This would comply with the requirements of Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49. 
 201. Because this exception relies on exigent circumstances, it is important that officers avoid any unnecessary 
delays; if there is an unreasonable and unexplainable delay, the police risk violating the cell phone user’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. See, e.g., Herring v. State, 168 So. 3d 240, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
 202. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). 
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instead replaced with entry into the suspect’s cell phone.203 At first glance, this might 
make sense because the previous two exceptions were adapted to allow the police to 
obtain CSLI by the same substitution. However, close inspection of the rule in 
Payton reveals a problem: unlike the rules based on exigent circumstances, the 
“arrest warrant exception” only allows the police to enter the suspect’s home.204 
Clearly then, applying Payton to CSLI presents a problem that it also presents in its 
original form—namely, what happens if the police track a suspect into a residence 
that is not his or her own?205 
In Steagald v. United States, the Court confronted this problem when the DEA 
sought to arrest a federal fugitive wanted for drug law violations.206 Believing that 
the fugitive was within a particular residence, the police entered the residence and 
discovered drugs inside; the person to be arrested was not there, nor did he live 
there.207 Thus, the police had entered the home of a third party searching for the 
subject of the arrest warrant. In rejecting the idea that the arrest warrant previously 
issued was sufficient to justify the entry into the residence, the Court pointed out that 
the arrest warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment rights of the person to be arrested, 
but not the rights of the third-party residents.208 If an arrest warrant could be used as 
the authority to enter the homes of third parties, it would effectively convert an arrest 
warrant—naming only the individual to be seized—into a general warrant, and 
clearly this is an undesirable result.209 Accordingly, in order to enter the residence of 
a third party, the Court held that the police must obtain a search warrant for the 
residence they wish to enter.210 
Requiring a search warrant to be issued based on the arrest warrant would defeat 
the purpose of a warrant exception, yet the issue created by Steagald must be dealt 
with in order to craft a valid exception that does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
rights of third parties. In considering an appropriate adaptation of the rule in Payton, 
it is important to note that obtaining and monitoring CSLI “is, of course, less 
intrusive” from an actual physical entry into a third-party residence; however, this 
 ________________________  
 203. The argument in this section assumes that the police have established, at least to the required burden of 
proof, that the subject of the arrest warrant has a cell phone and also have the number for the phone. 
 204. Id. (“[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries 
with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect 
is within”) (emphasis added). 
 205. Even if the police tracked a suspect into a third-party residence, unless the suspect has standing to object 
to a search of the residence, the evidence obtained in the form of tracking will still be admissible against that suspect. 
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719–20 (1984). This naturally means that if the police conduct electronic 
surveillance inside of a home but do not obtain evidence that is used against a party with standing, there can be no 
suppression of evidence. Certainly, anyone whose home is invaded by electronic surveillance could raise a claim 
against the government for a violation of his or her constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Because of 
this, despite what may be a situation in which the aggrieved party would receive only nominal damages due to the 
minimal harm associated with a non-physical intrusion into the home, this Note will seek to craft a rule that will 
avoid all Fourth Amendment violations, and not just violations that would result in the suppression of evidence. 
 206. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 206 (1981). 
 207. Id. at 206–07. 
 208. Id. at 216. 
 209. Id. at 220. 
 210. Id. at 222. 
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fact alone will not justify the rule to be created here.211 This is because the 
government violates the Fourth Amendment when it seeks to 
determine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and 
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a particular 
article—or a person, for that matter—is in an individual’s home at 
a particular time. Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has 
been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a 
threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort 
of Fourth Amendment oversight.212 
Given this, the Court would almost certainly hold that the mere fact the police are 
not making actual entry into a third-party residence, and instead just monitoring a 
cell phone signal, to determine the presence of a cell phone’s user is not enough to 
justify the “arrest warrant exception.” But a close examination of Karo may provide 
the solution for the proper formulation of this exception. Although the Court in Karo 
held that monitoring of the beeper while inside of a private residence was a search,213 
when they examined the monitoring of a beeper inside of a locker rented by two of 
the defendants, the Court held there was no Fourth Amendment violation because 
the beeper did not identify the specific locker that had the ether and revealed nothing 
about the contents of the locker.214 In fact, the police only identified which locker 
contained the ether when they walked in public areas of the facility and used their 
ordinary sense of smell to determine which locker contained the ether.215 
Using this holding allows the “arrest warrant exception” to justify obtaining 
CSLI despite the potential invasion of privacy to third parties. First, in obtaining 
either historical or real-time CSLI under this “exception,” the information obtained 
is exactly the same;216 while in limited circumstances this information could 
approach GPS-like precision,217 in most cases, law enforcement officials will receive 
information regarding which cell tower the user is or was connected to, and which 
sector of the cell phone tower the user was covered by.218 Thus, just like in Karo, the 
 ________________________  
 211. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (even though monitoring a beeper is not the same 
as a full-scale search, it reveals information about the interior of the home that the police could not have obtained 
without a warrant). 
 212. Id. at 716 (emphasis added). 
 213. Id. at 714. 
 214. Id. at 720. 
 215. Id. at 720–21. 
 216. Jones I, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 217. CDT, supra note 30, at 4. 
 218. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 515 (11th Cir. 2015). Moreover, in executing several search 
warrants to obtain both historical and real-time CSLI, the author has made several important observations. First, 
historical CSLI has, in every instance, only provided the location of the cell phone tower to which the cell phone 
was connected, and the sector that covered the location of the cell phone. Second, while “pinging” a phone and 
obtaining real-time CSLI can provide more accurate location information than its historical counterpart, it often 
lacks the precision of a GPS unit; the typical “location” of the phone covers three houses in a residential 
neighborhood and, despite what one may assume, the phone is not always located in the “middle” house, making 
finding the phone a shell game of sorts. Further, in urban areas, even near-GPS accuracy was not conclusive as to 
location, since these areas can contain duplexes, attached townhomes, and apartment complex buildings, just to 
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police will know the general area in which to search, but will likely not know 
precisely in which home (if any) the user currently resides, and they will have to use 
other legal methods to determine the precise location of the cell phone user. Since 
the CSLI obtained will reveal nothing about the inside of any home, like the lockers 
in Karo, the issues presented in Steagald are safely avoided.219 Further, when 
applying Wyoming v. Houghton and balancing the intrusion on individual privacy 
with the need to promote legitimate governmental interests,220 the “arrest warrant 
exception” proposed is reasonable. There is minimal intrusion on individual privacy 
because only the general location of the user’s phone is conveyed to law 
enforcement, there is judicial oversight to ensure there are no arbitrary invasions of 
privacy because a judge will have to first issue the arrest warrant in order for the 
police to make use of this exception, government action that complies with the law 
is presumed reasonable, and the information sought serves the compelling 
governmental interest of apprehending a wanted fugitive.221 
Although no case has yet to examine the use of the “arrest warrant exception” 
for CSLI,222 this too would be a relatively straightforward act. The police would 
provide a copy of the warrant, along with the suspect’s cell phone information, to 
the cell service provider, and the provider would then relay the CSLI to law 
enforcement as needed until the suspect is apprehended.223 Based on the holding in 
Payton and the other cases discussed, this should allow the police to avoid any Fourth 
Amendment violations. However, as a practical matter, this exception may never be 
tested. If the police have taken the time to obtain an arrest warrant for a criminal 
suspect, the same facts would likely support them obtaining a search warrant for the 
suspect’s CSLI, be it historical or real-time, in order to aid in the suspect’s 
apprehension.224  Further, obtaining a search warrant would allow the government to 
avoid the problems posed by improvements in technology, since the search warrant 
would likely satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as to any involved 
 ________________________  
name a few multi-unit housing structures; plain observations and additional resources were needed to narrow down 
the exact location of the phone. 
 219. Despite this, the “arrest warrant exception” may not survive long based on this justification; as 
technology continues to improve, the accuracy of locating a user’s cell phone may also improve to the point that the 
police will be able to narrow a suspect’s presence down to the interior of a residence. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 
25, at 26. When this happens, the government will move from Karo’s locker scenario to the scenario of its more 
famous holding—the monitoring of the interior of a home. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. At that point, Steagald again 
becomes an issue that must be dealt with if the government seeks to use this “exception.” 
 220. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). 
 221. See supra Part II.A for a full discussion of all these factors in the context of historical CSLI; they are 
equally applicable in the analysis of this “exception,” since the factors are used to test the reasonableness of 
government action in light of the Fourth Amendment. See also Rothstein, supra note 22, at 533 (“Tracking used 
exclusively to facilitate arrest is reasonable.”). 
 222. There is at least one case that discussed using CSLI in the context of facilitating arrest; specifically, 
United States v. Bermudez, No. IP05-0043-CR05-BF, 2006 WL 3197181, at *4–40 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006) aff’d 
sub nom. United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 2007). However, in this case, the CSLI was 
obtained pursuant to a court order, thus it is not directly applicable to the analysis of the “arrest warrant exception” 
contemplated here. Id. at *1. 
 223. This is similar to the process used in the exigent circumstances cases. See State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 
N.W.2d 748, 756 (Wis. 2014); United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 345–47 (D. Vt. 2013). 
 224. In fact, the author, in his capacity as a detective with over a decade of law enforcement experience, has 
used exactly the same facts provided in an arrest warrant to obtain a search warrant for both a suspect’s historical 
and real-time CSLI on several occasions. 
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third parties.225 Thus, while the “arrest warrant exception” could likely pass 
constitutional muster, as a practical matter its employment is unlikely. 
CONCLUSION 
Cell phones are an integral part of American life; in fact, many people forego 
obtaining a traditional telephone line in their home in favor of having solely a cell 
phone.226 Given the cell phone’s pervasive presence in American society, concern 
that these “lifelines” are not turned into tracking devices on a government whim is a 
legitimate concern. At the same time, completely denying the police the ability to 
use this tool to accomplish the legitimate purpose of law enforcement is undesirable. 
Thankfully, current law allows law enforcement officials to get this information with 
a court order, albeit on a standard below probable cause—and that is the crux of the 
current issue in the courts revolving around CSLI. Kendrick Herring was not the first 
person to be tracked using his cell phone information, but his case and the many 
other cases involving CSLI have been decided in a mire of case law surrounding the 
topic. Where some jurisdictions allow the police to obtain CSLI based solely on a 
court order, other jurisdictions demand a warrant; where some jurisdictions hold 
CSLI to be an invasion of privacy depending on whether real-time or historical CSLI 
is sought, others hold that CSLI should be treated the same regardless of what the 
government is seeking. 
Despite diverging opinions on the topic, one thing is certain; although the 
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue, relevant and binding case law 
from the Court supports the ability of the police to obtain CSLI without a warrant. 
The third-party doctrine created in Miller and applied to electronic surveillance in 
Smith clearly supports the assertion that the government only needs to obtain a court 
order in order to obtain CSLI in either of its forms. Simply put, CSLI is information 
generated and maintained by cell service providers as a business record, and this fact 
is widely known by cell phone users, who cannot maintain a realistic expectation of 
privacy in those records. So long as this doctrine exists in its current form, no warrant 
is required when the government seeks to obtain and use this information against a 
criminal defendant, and courts should deny motions to suppress evidence obtained 
alleging Fourth Amendment violations on this ground. 
While the third-party doctrine clearly controls the distribution of CSLI to law 
enforcement, the Court’s modification of this doctrine is not completely out of the 
question; in fact, it was plainly suggested in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in 
Jones, and other courts have ruled that a warrant is required for CSLI because the 
third-party doctrine is inapplicable. However, even if a warrant is required, the 
government can still obtain this information under three different exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. If members of law enforcement are in hot pursuit of a criminal 
suspect and quickly seek CSLI from the cell service provider, they can use the 
exception to the warrant requirement for exigent circumstances. Further, if the police 
 ________________________  
 225. Rothstein, supra note 22, at 526. 
 226. During the study conducted by the Pew Research Center, over half of the people interviewed over a cell 
phone did not have a landline telephone. See ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 16. 
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are attempting to render emergency aid to a 911 caller whose call is suddenly 
disconnected, they can use the same exception to the warrant requirement on the 
basis of public safety. Finally, although somewhat impractical, the government may 
be able to use the “arrest warrant exception” outlined in Payton in order to obtain 
CSLI for the subject of an arrest warrant. Thus, regardless of the final decision 
regarding a warrant requirement for CSLI, law enforcement should still be able to 
obtain this information in a timely fashion without a warrant when it is urgently 
needed. 
Given the value of this tool and the varying decisions in different jurisdictions, 
a decision from the Court is needed in order to decide, once and for all, the rules for 
using it. It is true that the law frequently lags behind technological advances, but cell 
phone technology has been available for quite some time, and decisions regarding 
this problem have been sprouting up for at least a decade. Every moment without 
firm guidance potentially leads to the loss of vital evidence in a criminal case—or 
worse, the opportunity to safeguard a life. However, a decision from the Supreme 
Court will give the police a firm guidepost, regardless of whether the Court chooses 
to require a warrant, and will make stable at least one small aspect of the constantly 
changing legal landscape that they must navigate each day. 
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